Smart Power Blog

Jefferson on Soft Power

2007-05-27T19:55:58Z

Not in [my] day, but at no distant one, we may shake a rod over the heads of all which may make the stoutest of them tremble. But I hope our wisdom will grow with our power and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be.

—Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Thomas Leiper (1815) from: The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed.), vol. 14, p. 308.

Is Machiavelli's Prince a model of Smart Power

2007-04-26T16:24:34Z

Cross-posted at MountainRunner, the following book review suggests looking at the largely forgotten Arab equivalent of Machiavelli, a Sicilian Arab named Muhammad ibn Zafar al-Siqilli. Ibn Zafar based his recommendations for his prince on the Muslim practices of leadership, of justice, and of tribalism. While Machiavelli and ibn Zafar match each other on a great number of points, the means differ which should indicate an alternative strategy of communication and rule over an Arab society.

The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha's excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are "accepted" by the Machiavellian power model.

Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.

]]> A Sicilian Arab, Muhammad ibn Zafar al-Siqilli, wrote a handbook for a prince 350 years before Machiavelli: Sulwan al-Muta' Fi 'Udwan al-Atba' (Consolation for the Ruler During the Hostility of Subjects). Joseph A. Kechichian and R. Hrair Dekmejian's book, The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership, analyzes the ibn Zafar's suggestions and compares ibn Zafar's ideas with Machiavelli's.

In crafting a communications strategy in Iraq, and the larger Muslim world, it should be valuable to consider the Arab Machiavelli's recommendations which stem from a Muslim view of legitimacy deeply rooted in tribal customs and a Prophet-inspired just public order. This awareness shaped his vision of power and virtue.

Ibn Zafar identified five standards for his prince who was "expected to establish not only an orderly polity, but one based on justice":

Trust in God (Tawfid)
Fortitude (Ta'assi)
Patience (Sabr)
Contentment (Rida)
Self-denial (Zuhd)

For the sake of this review, here are two examples of the differences between Machiavelli and ibn Zafar the authors highlight. The first is on advisors, the importance of which both Machiavelli and ibn Zafar agree on. They both also agree on the need for the advisor to uphold the ruler's interests above the advisor's own. The tie that binds the advisor to the prince is where things change. The Machiavellian heaps "honors on [his advisor], enriching him, placing him in his debt...so that he sees that he cannot do better without him." Essentially, buying the advisor.

Ibn Zafar, in contrast, creates a different indebtedness:

Amongst faithful and far-sighted counselors, he is most deserving of attention whose prosperity depends on your own, and whose safety is tied to yours. He who stands in such a position, exerting himself for your interests, will likewise serve and defend himself while fighting for you.

Superficially understood as winning the "hearts and minds", there is a deeper association between prince and advisor. A small example of this in practice was the soccer ball give-away program in Iraq. Initially, American soldiers gave the soccer balls directly to the children, but this had the adverse effect of demonstrating their fathers could not provide for them. The program was revised so that Iraqi Police gave the soccer balls to the fathers, who in turn gave them to the children and also began to assist the IP.

The second example I will give here is the importance of qualities held by the prince. To Machiavelli, the prince need only to appear to have positive qualities such as sympathy, religiosity, trustworthiness, honesty, and compassion. However, these may be tossed aside with cruelty and inhumanity it serves the interests. The ends always justifies the means. Ibn Zafar recommended "artifice, ruse, and falsehood" for the "good of the state", but the prince must be good, Godly, and humane. The means must correspond to the desire ends, except in cases of extreme crisis.

Understanding the framework of power of friend and foe alike is essential. Achieving moral legitimacy is one thing but if our language and actions are inherently counter to local understanding, then the chance of success diminishes and will increasingly rely on luck, not skill. Ibn Zafar informs us of nuances we otherwise are not aware of and my trample upon.

We have unintentionally permitted the strengthening of tribal and sectarian divisions that creates lines of power we have difficulty understanding and difficulty speaking to. The Just Prince provides guidance and language on the operations of Islamic groups just as Machiavelli provides guidance and language on the operations of Western groups.

If you think Machiavelli is relevant today, then you should read this book. Although it is an expensive book priced for the academic market, it is a valuable and informative read. If you think the $25 for a used copy is high, buy it with friends, expense it, or simply suck it up and buy it (The "new" price at $59.50 is just way too much).

In closing, two quotes that may have served some value three years ago:

"There are three species of creatures, who, if you do not lodge and nourish them as befits their worth, will immediately turn their backs and break with you: these are kings, men of letters and benefactors."

"The king who believes that the minds of princes are superior to those of counselors has fallen into great error. If he acquires the bad habit of contradicting a wise and faithful counselor -- without manifest reason -- it is certain that he will never prosper."

Language

2007-04-26T01:28:33Z

I suggest you read Shakespeare and the Art of Reputation Management from Hill & Knowlton's blog. Hill & Knowlton, for those who don't know, helped Kuwait strengthen the drumbeat for war against Iraq in the first Gulf War (for an excellent case study of H&K's role, see Jarol Manheim's Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence).

While the post is aimed at corporate communication, the quotes from Shakespeare's plays are easily transformed into guides for public diplomacy itself. Some bits from the post:

"Nothing can come of nothing: speak again." -- King Lear

“O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. -- Othello

“If you can't get rid of the skeleton in your closet, you'd best teach it to dance.” -- Richard II

Discussing War Powers

2007-04-18T07:34:48Z

The Council on Foreign Relations issued a backgrounder on American civil-military relations. No, I'm sorry, that's not what the backgrounder purports to be about, although it should. Robert McMahon wrote on the "different responsibilities" Congress and the President (it should still be an upper case "P" people) have in waging war but completely ignores some of the most important oversight powers of Congress.

]]> With all due respect, some of the comments in the backgrounder are simply silly, conflating guidance with democratic control of military force. Let me tread into dangerous waters by suggesting much more learned people than I are, well, misleading on the facts.

Noah Feldman wrote

The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare wars, fund them, and oversee the way they are fought. Yet the Constitution never says exactly how these powers are to be reconciled with the president's authority as commander in chief. The Constitution surely must empower the president to fight wars effectively enough to win them.
"Surely" surely implies that once the President gets the green light, he's able to run as he pleases. As Charles Stevenson adroitly points out, 11 of the 18 enumerated Congressional powers in the Constitution deal with security. You don't suppose the Founding Fathers were concerned a bit about a monolithic power, do you? A Jealous Eye indeed.
Professor Robert F. Turner's comment that Congress "can say you can’t have money, but what they can’t do is say you can have money only if you fight a certain way. Bringing up troops from the rear is right at the core of the command function [of] presidential power." On the first sentence, if Congress wanted to investigate the military, write another Goldwater-Nichols, or even, say, modify the Uniform Code of Military Justice, those would be wrong (whatever "wrong" is)? On the second half, let's not confuse strategic commitment with reinforcements.
Susan Low Bloch said the framers of the constitution deliberately divided the war powers between the two branches to induce them to work together on such a vital issue. "I don’t know if they expected conflict, but they wanted coordination and cooperation and shared responsibility," Bloch says. "I doubt that they wanted what we have right now." That seems to be at odds with the idea of checks and balances and the overall concern the Founding Fathers had with maintaining a standing Army, let alone paying for a standing Navy.
I find myself agreeing with John Yoo that "Congress is too fractured, slow, and inflexible to micromanage military decisions (LAT) that depend on speed, secrecy, and force." However, I agree less on his reasons than on the fact the President is to conduct war and Congress provides oversight.

American civil-military relations is quite different than British, French, German, or any other democracy's. The US Armed Forces have two masters, the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. Getting into the relationship of the military in this political process, ignoring for a moment the military-industrial complex (a famous phrase that included "Congress" in Eisenhower's original speech before editing), is ignored at the peril of ignoring reality. I know my reading list should be expanded, but maybe it should be sent to CFR?

(Cross-posted at MountainRunner.)

Smart Power Project website

2007-04-08T10:13:46Z

Visit the new parent website for this blog: the Smart Power Project.

The Smart Power FAQ

2007-04-08T09:30:12Z

The Smart Power FAQ (frequently asked questions) is online here. We encourage you to comment on the FAQ by posting a reply to this blog entry. We look forward to your comments.

The Wisdom of the Hammer

2007-03-23T07:13:54Z

Not-so-smart power hall of famer Tom Delay’s appearance on Sunday’s Meet the Press garnered a lot of attention from the liberal blogosphere this week (I must say that Mr. Russert’s stock dropped a few points for offering that invite. Fine…invite Perle. But Delay? C’mon Tim…if you want us up at 8:00 AM in LA, be serious). Lost in the hubbub, however, was a very revealing back-and-forth between former Congressman Tom Andrews (D-ME) and former Congressman Tom Delay (R-TX).

FMR. REP. ANDREWS: …And listen, you know, we in Washington love to talk about what's in the best interest of the, the people of Iraq. We've been doing this for years and years. Why don't we ask the people of Iraq what they think? If you ask the people... FMR. REP. DeLAY: Well, let's ask what's in the best interest of the American people. FMR. REP. ANDREWS: Well, ask the people--let's ask--let's ask the people of Iraq, OK? FMR. REP. DeLAY: No, let's ask the American people. FMR. REP. ANDREWS: What is--let's ask them first, OK? Because listen, they're the ones that have the most at stake. They're the ones that have the most at stake. FMR. REP. DeLAY: I'm more interested in the American people.

Many probably dismissed Delay’s arguments as four-year-old RNC talking points that people stopped taking seriously about, well, four years ago. But we smart power disciples have a lot to learn from what The Hammer had to say.]]> Win Without War, is genuinely concerned with the national security of the United States. After all, the stated aim of the group he represents is to “Keep America safe by advocating that international cooperation and enforceable international law provide the greatest security for the United States and the world.” Yet there was Delay, arguing that such cooperation is hogwash – that the only important opinions are American opinions (someone needs to tell Mr. Delay that he doesn’t want to ask the American people about this – that train left the station some time ago). The man was literally unable to comprehend how Iraqi support for U.S. involvement in Iraq is in any way relevant to U.S. success in the region. And he was until recently the most powerful man in the House. But Delay's position is not somehow unique. Quite the contrary. It's what much of U.S. post-9/11 foreign policy is built upon. What does the Hammer teach us? That we have a lot of work to do.

Bolton on Daily Show

2007-03-22T07:08:51Z

I saw this interview between of John Bolton by Jon Stewart from Tuesday's (or maybe Monday's) Daily Show. It was interesting as they really debated how much power the Pres. should have over the executive bureaucracy. It was basically a conversation about "who should be listening to whom" -- very relevant to our discussion today. Bolton basically argued that Bush listened to the American people in order to get elected, and then after that it was time for others to listen to him. This is a very formal, legalistic notion of politics. It is perfectly rational, but it is also another instance of the admin complaining that they can't be effective because other people (in this case bureaucrats) aren't doing "what they are supposed to do." This fundamentally misunderstands how power works in the new world. It also uses a double-standard when applied to the President vs. Congress. The President, according to Bolton's ideas, has the political prerogative to do everything legally permitted under his power regardless of how normal/abnormal or popular/unpopular it is. But Congress is "playing politics" if they pursue abnormal actions that are technically legal. It's worth noting that the same double-standard applies to foreign governments. If Muscharaff does not control factions in his country working against him, he is failing to live up to a bargain. If Bush can't control leaks in his own bureaucracy (e.g. CIA), it is the bureaucrats fault or perhaps the fault of "Washington Insiders."

Darfur -- What Tools to Use?

2007-03-13T19:52:07Z

coordinated plan. He basically dismisses some kinds of power - specifically military solutions, and then recommends a list of other things without tying them together. For instance, he seems to talk a lot about "applying pressure." What does that mean? What kind of pressure on whom via what instruments? I do not mean to criticize Nicholas Kristof on the issue of Darfur, he is a hero for championing this cause. My point is only that the need for smart power frameworks is very evident here. Anyway, article is below. I can remove if this will get us into trouble with the NYT. Notice also that we are invited to comment at www.nytimes.com/ontheground. Maybe a couple of us could write in?]]> March 13, 2007 Op-Ed Columnist How Do You Solve a Crisis Like Darfur? By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF For anyone who thinks that “genocide” is absolutely the rock-bottom possibility, keep an eye on Darfur. The area of crisis has already spread from an area the size of France to one the size of Western Europe, encompassing Chad and Central African Republic while threatening to reignite the separate war between north and south Sudan. And aid workers increasingly are finding themselves under attack, so that humanitarian access is now lower than at any time since 2004. Six weeks ago, I invited readers to send in their own suggestions for what we should do about Darfur, and the result was a deluge of proposals from all over the world. The common thread was a far more muscular approach. Several readers suggested that we should dispatch a private force — supplied by a military contractor like Blackwater USA — to fight the janjaweed militia. Many readers also recommended that we supply arms to Darfur refugees or rebel groups. Some people suggested that we blockade Port Sudan, through which Sudan exports oil. Many also wanted a much tougher approach toward China, which has protected Sudan diplomatically. Some advocated a boycott of all Chinese products, while others favor a boycott of the Beijing Olympics in 2008. After inviting the discussion, I feel ungrateful in criticizing such well-meaning suggestions — but I’m afraid that in the aftermath of the Iraq war, aggressive military measures would be counterproductive. We would be handing President Omar al-Bashir a propaganda victory and a chance to rally support (“Those American crusaders are trying to steal another Arab country’s oil!”). Likewise, Darfur is already awash with guns and irresponsible armed factions terrorizing civilians. The last thing Darfur needs is more AK-47s. As for China, a boycott would antagonize ordinary Chinese and cause Beijing to dig in its heels. But I like the idea of activists like Eric Reeves of organizing a “Genocide Olympics” campaign to shame Beijing into better behavior. Likewise, I approve of many suggestions that sought more television coverage of Darfur. The slacker now is ABC News. The Tyndall Report, which monitors network news coverage, found that ABC’s nightly newscasts included just 11 minutes of coverage of Darfur in all of 2006, compared with the 23 minutes ABC devoted to the false confession to the killing of JonBenet Ramsey. If only a Darfuri would falsely confess to killing JonBenet, maybe ABC would cover genocide ... I’ve posted more reader suggestions on my blog, www.nytimes.com/ontheground. But in general, what Darfur needs isn’t a single dramatic solution but a collection of incremental steps that add to the pressure for a peace agreement there. President Bush could ratchet up the pressure by giving a prime-time speech on Darfur. He and Tony Blair could lead a summit on Darfur in Europe. He could invite leaders of China and Egypt to join him on a trip to a Darfur refugee camp in Chad. Mr. Bush is expected to announce soon a series of financial sanctions on Sudan (similar to those that have inflicted considerable pain on North Korea and Iran), and those are welcome. Enforcing a no-fly zone would also help add to the pressure. But the top priority for Darfur is something that few people talk about — a negotiated peace agreement. Peacekeepers are desperately needed, but the only real hope for lasting security is a negotiated peace among all the tribes of Darfur. And that is conceivable: an attempt last April came close, but ultimately a flawed deal was reached that made the conflict worse. Human rights groups have laid out excellent proposals for a Darfur peace process, and they need a vigorous push. To get an agreement, Khartoum will have to make a few more concessions (such as naming a Darfuri vice president, uniting the Darfur provinces, verifying the disarming of janjaweed), and it will also have to allow rebels to meet to work out negotiating positions. Western countries should also pledge to help finance reconstruction and compensation schemes, as incentives to wary Darfuris to back a peace deal. So far the U.S. has spent $2.7 billion on Darfur, and it would be a bargain to invest several hundred million dollars in a peace. Otherwise, north central Africa may collapse completely into war and anarchy, costing us countless billions and resulting in several million deaths over the coming decade. You are invited to comment on this column at www.nytimes.com/ontheground.

Let's Look in the ToolBox

2007-03-11T01:20:55Z

Rather than an extended narration I'd like this entry to serve as a touchstone for discussion on the different implements of power. I want to focus specifically on what they do "well" and what how they are vulnerable. I have chosen 5 basic "types" of power: Thwarting Power Enforcement Power Incentive Power Social Power Psychological Power As you will see, they correspond to policy tools that we are familiar with. The military is clearly a part of thwarting power, economics related to incentives etc. But they are more general than "military," "economic" because in a changing world, the relevant categories may change. For example, denial of service internet attacks are thwarting power, but they do not generally come from a military apparatus. I am not an expert in these areas, so I am tossing things out in the hope that others will follow on with their comments. I do think we will need to formalize this at some point, so we want to keep things general/abstract so they can be applied to new situations. Hopefully this will make sense... Thwarting Power This is the ability to stop someone or something from doing something in a physical sense. It has no mental component whatsoever, meaning it ignores what the other "wills" or chooses. If you blow up an enemy tank, that tank can't fire on you. If you destroy a weapons factory, it can't make weapons. Strengths: Thwarting power, if possessed, is the most certain power because it does not leave anything to the choice of others, which is unpredictable. Thus, it is good for situations where an outcome cannot be left to chance because negative consequences are almost certain to follow if action is not taken. If enemy battleships are moving toward our shores, we try to destroy them. We do not hope they get close and then turn around, or actually are nice to use once they arrive. Weaknesses: The problem with thwarting power is that it is expensive/temporary and also messy. By expensive/temporary I mean that it is either one or the other. Thwarting power stops the particular event right now. You destroy the ship or the factory. You have done nothing to alter the likelihood of the ship coming back or the factory being rebuilt. This weakness can be avoided by using thwarting power over and over again. But this is expensive. Thwarting power is also undermined by its messiness. It is very difficult to use it to only effect the target to be thwarted. Thwarting power usually involves collateral damage, and sometimes this collateral damage undermines your other or longer term objectives. Enforcement Power Enforcement power is the power of the threat of thwarting to alter the choices that others will make. It could be a threat to inflict pain on them, but it could also be a threat to simply repeatedly thwart/destroy something they try to do. Patrols by troops or aircraft often serve this function. Strengths: Enforcement power can be deployed over a long period of time in a "standing" way. You can have a standing police force, a standing aircraft carrier in certain waters etc. It is not as expensive as thwarting because, if done well, a small amount of resources can stretch over a large scope. You don't need a cop on every corner to maintain order, you just need enough to be able to thwart when necessary. Weaknesses: The problem with enforcement power is that, because it relies on the enemy's perception, it requires careful symbolic management. To work, it has to mean what it is supposed to mean, or at least some equivalent that creates the same effect. In some cases this is no problem, but because enforcement power relies on thwarting power, and thwarting power is messy, enforcement power is weakened by over-use. Basically, the more you use enforcement power, the more confusing the message is. To reduce this risk enforcement power must be converted to thwarting only at precisely the right times. This requires a lot of information, which is expensive and difficult to manage. For example, thwarting "innocent" actions, even if only accidentally, is likely to be decoded by enemies as aggression rather than enforcement (see relationship between cops and citizens in many inner-cities). Once perceived as aggression, the enforcement principle is lost. Now resistance is increased, which requires more thwarting, which is expensive and messy etc. So a new equilibrium is reached where large amounts of resources are repeatedly deployed to thwart actions because enforcement is not really working. Incentive Power Incentive power includes both the ability to reward and punish. Importantly, it is distinguished from material powers (thwarting, enforecment) in that there is no intervention. It relies on mutual choice. It says "if you do A, I will do B, if not I will do C." Obviously, "B" must always be preferable to "C" for the other party, but neither B nor C directly effect the ability to do A, which is why it is not an intervention. Strengths: Incentive power has the benefit of being relatively inexpensive in the short term. It also has an important benefit of being an option in almost all situations. With at least some use of other powers to change the situation, incentive power can always be brought in. It also does not engender much long term resistance. Weaknesses: It basically has 4 weaknesses: 1. Valuation -- incentive power can only really be used when the value of alternatives can clearly be seen. 2. Options -- incentive power is easily undermined by the actions of others. This is the competitive market effect. Thus, it is best used when one has either a) unique assets to offer or b) has coordinated the actions of others as part of the deal, 3. Trust -- Incentive power requires some trust. There must be trust between the exchangers as well as between the other actors being coordinated in the deal. Social power is what creates trust (see below), without trust deals fall apart on tiny sticking points, e.g. who will act first. 4. Prices/end games -- The final problem with incentive power is that there is always the chance that you will pay your opponent just slightly more than you are offering. This can get expensive as opportunities for extortion may come about. If not complemented by other forms of power, incentives could be slowly perverted so that one side gets a far better deal than the other but the other has no alternative but to accept. Social Power Social power is actually the power we see at work most of the time. On a fundamental level, it is the ability to manipulate the other's position in the social group, including but not limited to the ability to have the other included or excluded entirely. The main idea behind social power is that one's status in the group (of whatever) carries with it large potential but unspecified benefits and costs. Thus, it is difficult to put a concrete value on it, also because it is very long-term focused. Exclusion from the group can set one back decades, if not permanently. It is related to trust and credibility. It maintains a general set of guidelines for conduct. It works by threatening the imposition of large, long term costs for infractions that are, presumably, easy to avoid (since everyone else avoids them). Strengths: The strength of social power is that it is inexpensive and works well over the long term. If used well, it minimizes the need for the other kinds of power and can serve as the basis of positive growth over time, that is, the reduction of the need for other forms of power. Weaknesses: Social power basically brings with it three drawbacks: 1. It requires a social community that is functioning/worth joining This is self explanatory. It may seem like this is a high bar but in fact it is a low one. Any actor who relies on more than one other actor is part of some kind of a community provided those two others have some access to each other. 2. It requires that you have a credible position in that social community Basically this means that to wield the power of social norms, one must stay within those norms oneself. It also requires that one consistently support the norms when others try to violate. This is the ongoing cost of social power. 3. It has no power over those who do not wish to be in the community (mortal enemies) Mortal enemies have no desire to be in the community, thus, they will ignore the prospects of their expulsion and see no reason to conform. Social power has no influence over them. Psychological Power Psychological power is basically the ability to manipulate. I'm thinking of two general things that can be manipulated, though there are probably others: truth (or perhaps "information"), ideals (or perhaps "emotions"). Though it may seem similar, this is different from social power in that it actually circumvents the choice of the other. In this way it is like thwarting power, but it does not effect the opponent's ability to do something, it works on their desire to do it, only without them realizing it. Information can be used as psychological power by changing what is perceived to be truth. If you can control what another believes to be true, you can control their actions. Emotions can be used as psychological power by changing what is perceived to be "good," i.e. ideals. If you can control emotions/ideals, you can control motivations which give some power over actions. Strengths: This is the most complete form of power in that it has the specificity and short-term immediacy of material intervention but can be deployed more sustainably in the long term, depending on other circumstances. Weaknesses: Pyschological power has three basic weaknesses. 1. It can be expensive in both the resource and cognitive sense. Depending on the situation, the control over information or emotions in order to achieve specific outcomes can require enormous amounts of analysis and precise actions. 2. Complexity -- even with infinite resources, it is possible that paradoxical or "double-bind" situations occur, where-in the psychological manipulation requires mutually exclusive actions, such as simultaneously sharing and hiding the same information. All kinds of tricks are invented to work around this, but there is a limit to this. 3. Reversals -- Probably the biggest weakness of this kind of power is that, if it is discovered to have been used, it reverses many of its effects. In particular, it motivates deep resentment and mobilization against you -- much deeper than messy thwarting. In the meantime, it totally loses its effectiveness as information is not trusted and attempts at emotional connection are recoiled from. If you blow it with psychological power, you are in big trouble. So basically, if you use this power, you can never let on that you are using it. Try to cloak in one of the others.]]>

No Military Solution

2007-03-10T00:54:35Z

The new commander of U.S. forces in Iraq gave his first news conference the other day and said that military force alone is "not sufficient" to end the violence in Iraq. He said that political negotiations "will determine in the long run the success of this effort." Furthermore, "any student of history recognizes there is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq..." This is significant that the commander himself says there is no military solution to this problem. It's time to use other sources of American power - cultural, political etc., instead of an over reliance on military force. Even for the commander of US forces, a smart solution involves more than military power. What would be the correct mix of smart power in this situation?

Civil-Military Relations

2007-03-09T00:33:23Z

The importance of understanding and establishing "proper" civil-military relations can't be understated both at home and in the troubled regions. The relationship between civilian and military leaderships dictates and is dicted by the freedom of the people. This relationship, in a democracy especially, is special and paramount and yet too many do not understand or get it.

]]> Why post on this? It is important to understand civil-military relations in an age where people:

Question whether public diplomacy and the management and projection of America's image should be owned by the military
Conflate military and civilian decision making
Do not understand why the military accepts "bad" orders

The list above could go on, but I'll stop and hope you add your own reasons in the comment section.

Below is a brief list of suggested resources to help understand the nature of US civil-military relations:

Warriors and Politicans is an excellent book that looks at the unique c-m relationship in the United States. Charlie examines how the military, under dual / dueling masters of the Executive and Legislative branches, developed over the two plus centuries after the Revolution and within parameters established by Founding Fathers, many of whom were military veterans, were wary of a standing army. (Also worthwhile is his more detailed discussion about US Secretaries of Defense in SecDef.)
Issues of Democracy: a 1997 US Information Agency (USIA) publication on the importance of civil-military relations in democracy.
Center for Civil-Military Relations: it is noteworthy that it is the military itself that dedicates substantial resources to understanding the importance of civil-military relations while the civilian educational system fails to teach the same. (Note the forthcoming book on the CCMR site, Reforming Intelligence, is about Intel and not the military per se.)
The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012: published in 1992 and revised over the years, Charles Dunlap's original portrayal of what happens when the US military decides to protect American society is scary. Turkey's military is known for intervening over the years to protect Kamalism and I've heard some in the US question why the US military doesn't do the same. Read this to understand the importance of a subordinate military.
H.R. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty : Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (a valuable read. McMaster is one of the new whiz kids working with Petreaus in Iraq)

If you really want to academic, then the following fill in the essential reading list:

Samuel Huntington's classic The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (the foundational book on US c-m even if out of date)
Samuel Finer's The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics
Peter Feaver's Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Although his principal-agent theory is busted by Stevenson's book above, this is still a good read. BTW- Feaver was the primary author of the 2005 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq")
Eliot Cohen's Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Cohen is the newest advisor to Condi)

One from Column A, One from Column B....

2007-03-08T04:16:16Z

Heard this on "Marketplace" while driving today: "Beijing's announcement that it's increasing military spending got some attention in Washington. Commentator Robert Reich explains that's just what the Chinese wanted." The Commentary continued: KAI RYSSDAL: Of course, it's not all about business and economic growth in China. Earlier this week, Beijing announced it'll increase military spending almost 18 percent this year to about $45 billion. That's about a tenth of what the Pentagon gets, but it was still enough to get a some attention in Washington. Commentator Robert Reich explains that's just what the Chinese wanted: ROBERT REICH: One clue is that China's announcement of its military build-up comes the same week Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson is scheduled to visit. Presumably to continue pressing China to raise the value of its currency in light of the huge and growing trade imbalance with America. You see, for China, economic security and military security go hand in hand. Both are part of the same strategy to make China a superpower. Maintaining its current 10 percent yearly growth rate necessitates reliable supplies of oil, natural gas, and other raw materials from all over the world — as well as the latest technologies. And China also needs growing export markets to absorb its increasing production, and provide jobs to the tens of millions of its people migrating from the countryside. All this, in China's view, necessitates being able to play power politics — both with Middle East and Russian oil producers — whenever tensions arise over energy supplies. And China needs to be able to flex its muscle with Japan, Europe, and America in the competition for energy and other critical raw materials — as well as continue to have access to technologies these nations possess. And it needs to keep its access to these hugely important markets. So China's military build-up isn't a direct threat to the U.S. Power politics in today's world doesn't require the direct exercise of military power so much as the capacity to pressure other major powers indirectly. For example, credibly threatening to use force against Taiwan. Or selling advanced weapons systems to developing nations. Or, in the case of North Korea, becoming the source of food and weapons. Sound familiar? China is not inventing this strategy of combining economic power with military power. It's following in the footsteps of the nation that wrote the playbook on how it's done: the United States. That's why China's military announcement was timed to coincide with Hank Paulson's visit — and why Paulson's economic mission may be lost in translation." Interview is available at: http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2007/03/07/PM200703078.html

Public Diplomacy by a (big D) Democrat

2007-03-07T18:24:50Z

McClatchy News Service ran a great story in the Minneapolis paper yesterday on Congressman Keith Ellison's participation in a number of public diplomacy initiatives by the Bush State Department. Ellison, as we know, is the first ever Muslim Member of Congress, and has been a huge target of the right wing for his decision to take his oath of office using the Qur'an. Still, State Department officials have used Ellison to "promote American values and confront ideological support for terrorism around the world" in a number of different media. Step in the right direction for sure... Thanks to TPM Cafe for the tip...

Hey Guys - Can We Just Talk About This?

2007-02-28T17:57:29Z

Finally, in a situation desperate for some good news - we finally got some. In the middle of what has become an annual hike to the Hill to ask for more money for Iraq, Secretary of State Rice dropped a little surprise on us all:

I am pleased to tell Members of Congress that there is now being formed a neighbors conference to support Iraq. This conference is being spearheaded, and properly so, by the government of Iraq. Invitees will include Iraqs immediate neighbors, as well as representatives from other regional states, multilateral organizations, and the UN Permanent Five (the U.S., France, Britain, Russia and China). I would note that both Syria and Iran are among Iraqs neighbors invited to attend.

It would appear that this was an announcement that the Administration wanted to be heard. The excerpts of Rice's prepared remarks posted on State's Web site focused exclusively on this area of her remarks. Immediate reactions from Iran seem to be positive, so despite the fact that this is something the U.S. might have done about three years ago, we'll all have to file this in the "we'll take what we can get at this point" folder. (An about face of this magnitude is almost enough to get us to ignore that in the Administration's $5.99 billion supplemental request, only $20 mil is slotted for public diplomacy.)