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The Council on Foreign Relations issued a backgrounder on American civil-military relations. No, I'm sorry, that's not what the backgrounder purports to be about, although it should. Robert McMahon wrote on the "different responsibilities" Congress and the President (it should still be an upper case "P" people) have in waging war but completely ignores some of the most important oversight powers of Congress.

I suggest you read Shakespeare and the Art of Reputation Management from Hill & Knowlton's blog. Hill & Knowlton, for those who don't know, helped Kuwait strengthen the drumbeat for war against Iraq in the first Gulf War (for an excellent case study of H&K's role, see Jarol Manheim's Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence).

While the post is aimed at corporate communication, the quotes from Shakespeare's plays are easily transformed into guides for public diplomacy itself. Some bits from the post:

"Nothing can come of nothing: speak again." -- King Lear

“O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. -- Othello

“If you can't get rid of the skeleton in your closet, you'd best teach it to dance.” -- Richard II

Cross-posted at MountainRunner, the following book review suggests looking at the largely forgotten Arab equivalent of Machiavelli, a Sicilian Arab named Muhammad ibn Zafar al-Siqilli. Ibn Zafar based his recommendations for his prince on the Muslim practices of leadership, of justice, and of tribalism. While Machiavelli and ibn Zafar match each other on a great number of points, the means differ which should indicate an alternative strategy of communication and rule over an Arab society.

The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha's excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are "accepted" by the Machiavellian power model.

Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.