From Harper's Magazine:
Not in [my] day, but at no distant one, we may shake a rod over the heads of all which may make the stoutest of them tremble. But I hope our wisdom will grow with our power and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be.
—Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Thomas Leiper (1815) from: The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed.), vol. 14, p. 308.
Cross-posted at MountainRunner, the following book review suggests looking at the largely forgotten Arab equivalent of Machiavelli, a Sicilian Arab named Muhammad ibn Zafar al-Siqilli. Ibn Zafar based his recommendations for his prince on the Muslim practices of leadership, of justice, and of tribalism. While Machiavelli and ibn Zafar match each other on a great number of points, the means differ which should indicate an alternative strategy of communication and rule over an Arab society.
The approach to state-building in Iraq is anchored in Western concepts of governing. Many, myself included, would argue this was an acceptable approach in the Golden Hour after the initial resistance was crushed or crumbled before resistance could organize and the shock wore off. In this power vacuum, the United States was dealing with a largely secular state that had a strong sense of national identity (see Adeed Dawisha's excellent book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century for details). However, as the Golden Hour slipped away and the opportunity to rebuild was squandered and religious men, fakers, and criminals stepped into the vacuum, the framework for discourse changed. The Western Machiavellian mindset was being displaced by a retreat into religion and tribalism, neither of which are "accepted" by the Machiavellian power model.
Especially today, four years into the occupation of an Arab country at the cross-roads of Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, and West and East, we should reconsider how power is spoken, framed, and understood. Other authors have written on this, some I have reviewed previously, and some I will review in the future.
Continue reading "Is Machiavelli's Prince a model of Smart Power" »
I suggest you read Shakespeare and the Art of Reputation Management from Hill & Knowlton's blog. Hill & Knowlton, for those who don't know, helped Kuwait strengthen the drumbeat for war against Iraq in the first Gulf War (for an excellent case study of H&K's role, see Jarol Manheim's Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence).
While the post is aimed at corporate communication, the quotes from Shakespeare's plays are easily transformed into guides for public diplomacy itself. Some bits from the post:
"Nothing can come of nothing: speak again." -- King Lear
“O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. -- Othello
“If you can't get rid of the skeleton in your closet, you'd best teach it to dance.” -- Richard II
The Council on Foreign Relations issued a backgrounder on American civil-military relations. No, I'm sorry, that's not what the backgrounder purports to be about, although it should. Robert McMahon wrote on the "different responsibilities" Congress and the President (it should still be an upper case "P" people) have in waging war but completely ignores some of the most important oversight powers of Congress.
Visit the new parent website for this blog: the Smart Power Project.
The Smart Power FAQ (frequently asked questions) is online here. We encourage you to comment on the FAQ by posting a reply to this blog entry. We look forward to your comments.
Not-so-smart power hall of famer Tom Delay’s appearance on Sunday’s Meet the Press garnered a lot of attention from the liberal blogosphere this week (I must say that Mr. Russert’s stock dropped a few points for offering that invite. Fine…invite Perle. But Delay? C’mon Tim…if you want us up at 8:00 AM in LA, be serious).
Lost in the hubbub, however, was a very revealing back-and-forth between former Congressman Tom Andrews (D-ME) and former Congressman Tom Delay (R-TX).
FMR. REP. ANDREWS: …And listen, you know, we in Washington love to talk about what's in the best interest of the, the people of Iraq. We've been doing this for years and years. Why don't we ask the people of Iraq what they think? If you ask the people...FMR. REP. DeLAY: Well, let's ask what's in the best interest of the American people.
FMR. REP. ANDREWS: Well, ask the people--let's ask--let's ask the people of Iraq, OK?
FMR. REP. DeLAY: No, let's ask the American people.
FMR. REP. ANDREWS: What is--let's ask them first, OK? Because listen, they're the ones that have the most at stake. They're the ones that have the most at stake.
FMR. REP. DeLAY: I'm more interested in the American people.
Many probably dismissed Delay’s arguments as four-year-old RNC talking points that people stopped taking seriously about, well, four years ago. But we smart power disciples have a lot to learn from what The Hammer had to say.
I saw this interview between of John Bolton by Jon Stewart from Tuesday's (or maybe Monday's) Daily Show.
It was interesting as they really debated how much power the Pres. should have over the executive bureaucracy. It was basically a conversation about "who should be listening to whom" -- very relevant to our discussion today. Bolton basically argued that Bush listened to the American people in order to get elected, and then after that it was time for others to listen to him. This is a very formal, legalistic notion of politics. It is perfectly rational, but it is also another instance of the admin complaining that they can't be effective because other people (in this case bureaucrats) aren't doing "what they are supposed to do."
This fundamentally misunderstands how power works in the new world. It also uses a double-standard when applied to the President vs. Congress. The President, according to Bolton's ideas, has the political prerogative to do everything legally permitted under his power regardless of how normal/abnormal or popular/unpopular it is. But Congress is "playing politics" if they pursue abnormal actions that are technically legal. It's worth noting that the same double-standard applies to foreign governments. If Muscharaff does not control factions in his country working against him, he is failing to live up to a bargain. If Bush can't control leaks in his own bureaucracy (e.g. CIA), it is the bureaucrats fault or perhaps the fault of "Washington Insiders."
I saw this in today's (3/13/07) NY Times (see text pasted in the extended body below -- NYT doesn't allow permanent links to its Timeselect content, presumably because of their deep committment to furthering knowledge and understanding). It's a column by Nicholas Kristof where he comments on suggestions from readers on how to handle Darfur.
It was interesting. The main thing I noticed was that Kristof does not appear to have a coordinated plan. He basically dismisses some kinds of power - specifically military solutions, and then recommends a list of other things without tying them together. For instance, he seems to talk a lot about "applying pressure." What does that mean? What kind of pressure on whom via what instruments?
I do not mean to criticize Nicholas Kristof on the issue of Darfur, he is a hero for championing this cause. My point is only that the need for smart power frameworks is very evident here. Anyway, article is below. I can remove if this will get us into trouble with the NYT. Notice also that we are invited to comment at www.nytimes.com/ontheground. Maybe a couple of us could write in?
Rather than an extended narration I'd like this entry to serve as a touchstone for discussion on the different implements of power. I want to focus specifically on what they do "well" and what how they are vulnerable. I have chosen 5 basic "types" of power:
Thwarting Power
Enforcement Power
Incentive Power
Social Power
Psychological Power
As you will see, they correspond to policy tools that we are familiar with. The military is clearly a part of thwarting power, economics related to incentives etc. But they are more general than "military," "economic" because in a changing world, the relevant categories may change. For example, denial of service internet attacks are thwarting power, but they do not generally come from a military apparatus.
I am not an expert in these areas, so I am tossing things out in the hope that others will follow on with their comments. I do think we will need to formalize this at some point, so we want to keep things general/abstract so they can be applied to new situations.
Hopefully this will make sense...
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